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Introduction 
While Congress passed Dodd-Frank to create greater control and regulation of the 
financial markets following the collapse of some of the world’s largest financial institutions, 
some of its language contains vagueness in an extraterritorial enforcement clause that creates 
important international policy questions for the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(hereafter “SEC”) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (hereafter “CFTC”) to 
solve. A misguided approach could lead to a regulatory policy that negates much of the very 
purpose of the legislation. Under Sec. 722(d) of Dodd-Frank, the U.S. Government and its 
enforcement and regulatory agencies are not to obtain jurisdiction or enforcement over 
derivative activities taking place outside of the United States unless those activities have a 
“direct and significant connection” to the United States.1 A difficult to navigate debate has 
thus ensued which asks just how far the regulatory agencies should be able to reach into 
financial transactions which partially or wholly take place outside of U.S. borders.2 
Enforcement and jurisdictional questions are abound as the U.S. agencies must balance 
international policy, politics, and commercial realities against protecting the very purpose of 
important financial regulations that were created to prevent such financial calamities from 
again taking place within the United States. 
 In determining how the CFTC should apply this rule, it is important to evaluate 
what specific problems exist and what the agency is trying to solve. This analysis should take 
account of existing agency commentary and the full context and content of the statute itself. 
Additionally, the regulations implicate several problems of extraterritorial and jurisdictional 
application that would be clarified by a jurisprudential or rulemaking analogy from which the 
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  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
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CFTC can draw parallels of policy enforcement. The use of an existing enforcement analogy 
seems most efficient and legally sound, as opposed to a reinvention of the policy wheel type 
approach.  
This paper will argue that a strong analogy can be found in antitrust jurisprudence. The 
antitrust framework is of apt comparison because it has a long track record of relative 
success, and courts have experience with its concepts and principles of extraterritorial 
enforcement.  With such a framework as our base, it is then necessary to look at the 
ramifications of what such a policy means in the broader picture. While antitrust principles 
offer a solid foundation, it will be explained that the regulation of derivatives has almost 
inverse concerns to antitrust issues as, in the case of derivatives, the most restrictive nation 
faces issues of financial flight of derivative activities to less regulated markets.3 Thus, this 
paper will conclude with an examination of what strong domestic regulations would mean in 
regards to global enforcement.    
The Legislation: What it Says and What the CFTC and the Banks Argue It 
Says…So Far 
Section 722(d) of the legislation states as follows: 
(d) APPLICABILITY.—Section 2 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2) (as amended by 
section 723(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(i) APPLICABILITY.—The 
provisions of this Act relating to swaps that were enacted by the Wall Street Transparency and 
Accountability Act of 2010 (including any rule prescribed or regulation promulgated under that 
Act), shall not apply to activities outside the United States unless those activities— ‘‘(1) have a 
direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States; or  
‘‘(2) contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may prescribe or promulgate as are 
necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any provision of this Act that was enacted by 
the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010.’4    
 
 The legislation, on its face, indicates that Congress was worried about the reach of such 
regulations, attempting to limit enforcement and jurisdictional boundaries to U.S. based actors 
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4 Dodd Frank, supra note 1, at 722(d).	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and activities.5 A broader rule would bring about tensions in international comity and may be 
difficult to enforce as each nation wants to be able to regulate activity within its own borders, 
just as the United States wants to enforce Dodd-Frank domestically.6 At the same time, some 
type of reach must exist and collaborate with the principles of comity and cooperation as $600 
trillion worth of derivative transactions take place across multi-national borders and have 
dramatic implications on the commerce of so many nations.7 At the same time, even though 
Congress’s main goal is to regulate domestic action, subsections (1) and (2) clearly address a 
concern that U.S. banks or foreign actors and entities will somehow move activities offshore that 
will still have a relation or an effect on the United States.8 These subsections give the CFTC 
some amount of reach, one that is not clearly defined, to prevent offshore activities which might 
otherwise circumvent the American domestic regulations. While international enforcement or 
jurisdiction may be difficult, Congress created a vague opening for the CFTC to target entities 
attempting to hide activities in international forums or subsidiaries that ultimately still have 
effect on the United States’ financial system and economy. 
 It seems clear that if the legislation is to mean anything at all, there has to be some reach 
of Dodd-Frank to overseas activity. The question is, how far? The application of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction creates numerous concerns including how to make a national or international 
clearinghouse process effective, coordinating capital and margin requirements, and centralizing 
data reporting and record keeping functions.9 All of these areas ultimately play into the 
extraterritorial question as each nation or group of nations will be implementing their own rules 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Testimony Before the U.S. House Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. (June 16, 2011) (statement by Gary 
Gensler, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n).   
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Dodd Frank, supra note 1, at 722(d). 
9 Gensler Testimony, supra note 5.	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on all of these issues. When rules are not uniform, the possibility of a break in comity arises, 
creating the muddy and potentially contentious waters that are likely to open up once the 
implementation process begins internationally.10 Additional questions are thus raised: Will it 
apply to U.S. companies who are acting overseas? What about if the action is through an 
international subsidiary? What if both actors to an activity are completely foreign based? Are 
these activities potentially enforceable under U.S. law at all? If so, what amount of effect must 
they have? The answer of where the line is may be difficult to draw as the CFTC has to weigh 
international cooperation against the effect such enforcement would have on domestic 
commerce. 
 The CFTC has given some initial commentary on where it currently stands. Gary 
Gensler, the Chairman of the CFTC, recently spoke about the CFTC’s current progress in its 
rulemaking procedures regarding implementation of the derivative’s regulation, including 
extraterritorial issues under 722(d). His first speech occurred on June 16, 2011 in front of the 
U.S. House of Representatives;11 he also spoke on October 13, 2011 as part of a panel on 
“Global Reform for Derivatives Markets” at the London School of Economics.12 Gensler 
received a good amount of attention in London, which is of no coincidence since its markets, as 
the financial center of Europe, may be most affected by the CFTC’s ultimate enforcement 
procedures.13 Gensler highlighted the importance of interplay between the U.S. regulations and 
regulations that were occurring around the world, stating that Japan, the European Commission, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ethan Mark, Making Sense of Dodd-Frank, Nov. 17, 2010, available at http://dodd-frank.com/cftc-proposes-
rules-on-registration-of-swap-dealers-and-major-swap-participants-and-requests-comment-on-extraterritorial-reach-
of-registration-requirements/. 
11 Gensler Testiony, supra note 5. 
12 Gary Gensler, Chariman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Speech at the London School of Economics (Oct. 
13, 2011).  (As summarized by Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Clients and Friends Memo: CFTC Chairman 
Discusses Derivatives Reform in London (Oct. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/102111_-_CFTC.pdf 
13 Id.	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Canada, and other nations are all in the process of developing their own reforms, hopefully 
similar to that of the United States.14  
Gensler addressed the amazing new reach of the agency by stating that “the CFTC and 
the SEC will, for the first time, have oversight of the swaps and security-based swaps markets. 
The CFTC’s remit is growing from a marketplace that has a notional value of approximately $40 
trillion to one with a notional value of approximately $300 trillion.”15 Gensler then emphasized 
the importance of comity, “As we work to implement the derivatives reforms in the Dodd-Frank 
Act, we are actively coordinating with international regulators to promote robust and consistent 
standards and avoid conflicting requirements in swaps oversight.”16 Thus, how the CFTC 
ultimately deals with 722(d) is no small or light decision. Yet, the agency appears to be stalled. 
722(d) was first directly addressed in the House hearing in June of 2011 when Gensler stated that 
the CFTC was still developing a plan of implementation and that a public comment stage was 
still in the works, meaning any actual implementation would still be down the road.17 A few 
months later in London, it seemed little progress had been made as Gensler stated that full and 
official stages of public comment would not be done until at least 2012, meaning any actual 
implementation of the rule remains a future based proposition.18 
In London, Gensler paid even more attention to the extraterritorial question than at his 
hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives.19 Still, while Gensler was essentially 
answering questions on 722(d), most of his responses related to universal norms, highlighting the 
notion that the European Union should attempt to best mirror the proposals the United States has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Gensler Testimony, supra note 5. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Gensler Speech, supra note 12. 
19 Id.	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already put forward as implementation stateside is arguably ahead of their European 
counterparts.20 The tone was one of cooperation to best create symmetrical enforcement and 
regulation, thus allowing the United States an easier way out from a potential overreach of 
722(d). If the regulations are similar in the EU, 722(d) becomes a much simpler proposition as 
fewer enforcement discrepancies are likely to arise, and the United States can further ensure that 
the overall purpose of Dodd-Frank stays intact without having to counterbalance what otherwise 
might be lighter regulations overseas. 
 To promote such uniformity, Gensler stated that the EU should work with the United 
States so that the two groups could come up with similar requirements on clearing, capital and 
margin amounts, and transparency.21 While it is a potentially difficult proposition to tell another 
nation or group of nations that it should copy the rules of the United States, Gensler’s defense of 
such an idea relied on the notion that the United States’ rules have already been set forth, as 
opposed to the still developing talks in Europe.22 Still, to lessen conflict, Gensler pointed out that 
Dodd-Frank allows the CFTC to utilize and recognize “the rules of foreign regimes which are 
comprehensive and comparable to U.S. regulatory framework.”23 Finally, on the issue of 722(d) 
directly, “The Chairman stressed that Dodd-Frank would not cover activities which did not have 
a direct and significant effect on commerce in, or on the commerce of, the United States. He 
explained that he felt that this requirement was clear in itself…”24 When asked for more specifics 
as to the type of transactions and activities that would be reachable under 722(d), “the Chairman 
explained that it would probably not cover transactions between foreign entities in foreign 
countries, but that it was foreseeable that it could touch on transactions between U.S. entities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.	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outside of the U.S., particularly if an entity is guaranteed by a U.S. parent.”25 While that seems 
understandable, Gensler admits the possibility that U.S. entities operating overseas could find 
themselves within enforcement reach.26 Thus, the answer apparently becomes no clearer. Must 
this be a subsidiary? Must it be the corporation itself? How related does this entity have to be to 
its U.S. entity? And, while Gensler has stated that completely foreign entities are unlikely to be 
regulated,27 even that does not seem to be a definite.   
 In contrast to the vague statements of the CFTC, the banks have taken quite a different 
approach, offering a specific and pointed public comment. Through their representative law firm 
of Sullivan and Cromwell, on February 22, 2011, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and 
Citigroup wrote a comment letter to the SEC and the CFTC.28 Their view on swap registration 
and regulation was summarized by stating that, “to the extent that the activities of the 
Companies’ Non-U.S. Operations take place with non-U.S. persons outside of the United 
States,” these activities should not be subject to registration or regulation requirements otherwise 
imposed by the CFTC on transactions which are strictly domestic in nature.29 Accordingly, if the 
banks were to get their way, this would potentially exempt them from many clearing and data 
reporting requirements. Furthermore, while the CFTC was vague in their description of specific 
examples, the banks tried to outline bright line rules of foreign activities which should not be 
regulated: 
Non-U.S. Operations should not be considered swaps entities, or be required to register as such, 
solely on the basis that they are affiliated with, or, in the case of non-U.S. branches of U.S. banks, 
a part of, a U.S. bank. - Non-U.S. Operations that engage in swaps activities should fall within the 
definition of swaps entity only if they engage in swap activities with U.S. persons, other than in 
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26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Comment Letter From Sarah Lee, Carl Howard, & Diane Genova, General Counsels and Managing Director of 
Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., and JP Morgan Chase & Co., respectively, to CFTC and SEC (Feb. 22, 
2011) (on file with the SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-39-10/s73910-60.pdf. 
29 Id.	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any de minimis amount authorized by the final rules and in transactions with their U.S. affiliates 
for purposes of risk management. - Engaging in transactions with non-U.S. counterparties whether 
or not the non-U.S. counterparties have a U.S. affiliate should not cause the Non-U.S. Operations 
to be swaps entities provided that the transactions are not conducted out of  the Non-U.S. 
Operations to evade the requirements of  Title VII. - The presence of a guarantee by one of the 
Companies or its U.S. subsidiaries of a swap transaction engaged in by a Non-U.S. Operation with 
a non-U.S. counterparty should not cause the Non-U.S. Operation to be considered a swaps 
entity.30 
 
These proposals by the banks are none too surprising as they of course are likely to argue for as 
little regulation as possible. The implication of the banks’ argument is that a domestic 
institution’s guarantee of international derivative transactions does not have a significant impact 
on American commerce and that such activities can properly be regulated by another 
international jurisdiction. This argument is flawed as it denies the reality that ill-regulated 
derivative activities occurring in other territories can still have an immense effect on domestic 
commerce and institutions, especially if the domestic institution was a guarantee at some level in 
the transaction. If a Lehman like collapse occurred offshore, there is little doubt the contagion 
effect could reach the U.S., only all the more likely if a U.S. institution was such a guarantee. 
This is corroborated by Gensler’s statement that it was conceivable that the CFTC would look at 
activities that took place in foreign territories, particularly if they were guaranteed by a U.S. 
entity.31  
 Secondly, the banks’ argument leaves open what constitutes activity that is meant to 
circumvent U.S. regulation. In the middle of the banks’ letter, they state that transactions with 
non-U.S. counterparties should not be regulated domestically “provided that the transactions are 
not conducted out of the Non-U.S. Operations to evade the requirements of Title VII.”32 This 
merely raises further questions: How is the intent to “evade” shown, and who bears the burden of 
persuasion? Must the CFTC first file an audit or investigation on the activity? Or, must the banks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Id. 
31 Gensler Testimony, supra note 5. 
32 Lee, Howard, & Genova, supra note 28.	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or those who guarantee or have a subsidiary that participates in such an action demonstrate a 
legitimate purpose to the transactions, and, if so, how often must they show this? Must they meet 
clearing requirements abroad or here at home? Thus, even the arguments provided by those most 
resistant to regulation offer little to help resolve the multitude of challenging policy questions. 
This lack of clarity creates an opportunity to look toward analogous extraterritorial enforcement 
principles that can be adopted to help the CFTC explain how “direct and significant” may 
actually apply in the derivatives context. With so many contradictions and with so little of 
Section 722(d) defined as of yet, the need for a more definitive jurisprudential scope of 
extraterritorial enforcement in thus apparent. This opens up the argument for the analogy to 
international enforcement under antitrust law. 
Antitrust Enforcement: An Analogy of Useful Guidance to Help the CFTC Answer Some of 
its Extraterritorial Dilemmas 
 While there may be many helpful comparisons to international enforcement in multiple 
regulatory areas, an analogy to extraterritorial enforcement within the framework of antitrust law 
seems particularly apt. International antitrust enforcement operates under the notion that 
corporations based in one country may fall under the regulatory reach of another jurisdiction.33 
This reach often means the corporation must follow the antitrust regulations of two, if not 
multiple, regulatory agencies.34 This takes place as any jurisdiction that believes it may be 
impacted by the activities of the corporation wants to have a say in the proposed or ongoing 
activity. Such is often the case in international mergers where a corporation from one jurisdiction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See generally Sam Halibi, The Comity of Empagran: The Supreme Court Decides That Foreign Competition 
Regulation Limits American Antitrust Jurisdiction Over International Cartels, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 279 (2005).  
34 William Kolasky, International Comity in Antitrust: Advances and Challenges, 22 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 16 
(May 25, 2007).	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is merging or acquiring a corporation from another jurisdiction.35 Still, extraterritorial 
enforcement can reach even further as one jurisdiction may claim enforcement abilities just 
because the corporation sells products in its market, even though the corporation has no 
management base in the jurisdiction.36 Additionally, this reach can potentially even take place if 
a jurisdiction has no direct relation to the corporate activity other than a worry that such activity 
may, for example, limit the competiveness of one of the jurisdiction’s own corporations, likely a 
domestic competitor who may be hurt by the activity of the outside corporation.37 A likely 
defense of such expansive reach is that such an activity would have a dramatic effect on the 
commerce of the nation enforcing extraterritorial reach, under the guise that such activity would 
ultimately have effect on the consumers in said country, such as an increase in consumer 
prices.38 Thus, corporate activities and mergers can be blocked globally by the regulative action 
of a single jurisdiction.39 This often takes place as the corporation would ultimately like to 
participate in the regulating jurisdiction, especially if that jurisdiction is a large area of 
commerce, such as the U.S. or the E.U.40 In contrast, extraterritorial reach from a smaller nation 
such as Israel might not destroy such a merger as the merging corporations may simply decide to 
avoid the Israeli market, if not approved, as much more could still be gained by the merger as a 
whole than the little bit of commercial activity they may be losing from Israel.41 Still, even such 
a limited commercial zone may find ways to create leverage as it may still remain a viable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See generally Id. 
36 Michael Elliott, The Anatomy of the GE-Honeywell Disaster, TIME MAGAZINE, July 08, 2001. 
37 Jeremy Grant & Damien Neven, The Attempted Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell: A Case Study 
of Transatlantic Conflict (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/honeywell.pdf. 
38 See Elliott, supra note 36. 
39 Id. 
40 Grant & Neven, supra note 37. 
41 Michael Gal, Extra-territorial Application of Antitrust – The Case of a Small Economy, LAW AND ECONOMICS 
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES WORKING PAPER No. 09-03 (2009), available at https://mail-
attachment.googleusercontent.com/attachment?ui=2&ik=b8fc2a31ce&view=att&th=132ee98e7d97ee05&attid=0.7
&disp=inline&realattid=f_gtlndqgz6&safe=1&zw&saduie=AG9B_P8x8NJ8FSYI28iL6VyimKR5&sadet=1324324
318138&sads=f_EWqqzgW4pT0RL2qdbH9D_i0pM.	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market the corporation does not want to lose.42 When a larger commercial zone, such as the 
European Union, blocks the deal, the corporation may likely withdrawal from the merger, unable 
to lose out on the entire European market.43 To prevent a nightmarish scene of never ending 
discrepancy between various nations’ regulatory agencies, the principles of comity and 
cooperation are often paramount in the antitrust context.44 Still, complications can arise.   
 The last century has created an expanding amount of mergers, acquisitions, and other 
corporate activities that sometimes have a dramatic effect on commerce. It is in investigating 
such publicized cases as the GE/Honeywell merger attempt that an analogy between international 
antitrust comity skirmishes and potential future extraterritorial battles regarding financial 
regulations begins to appear. But, before getting to GE/Honeywell as a representative example, it 
is important to understand that the foundation of requiring a substantial connection is also used 
in the context of antitrust enforcement. 
    A particularly illustrative example of modern day comity conflict arose in the Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California case where United Kingdom based insurance corporations 
argued against extraterritorial reach of the United States.45 The U.S. Supreme Court found that, 
“Although the proposition was perhaps not always free from doubt, it is well established by now 
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact 
produce some substantial effect in the United States.”46 In the antitrust context, this foreign 
conduct includes actions by foreign parties that affect the market and market prices in the United 
States.47 Even though the Court stated that international comity should be a consideration, the 
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Court still said such a consideration could ultimately be limited and fail as a preventative factor 
for the United States to exercise extraterritorial enforcement.48 In an example of such a case, the 
Court started with the comity proposition that the “application of [American] antitrust laws to the 
(European insurance) market(s) ‘would lead to significant conflict with English law and 
policy…and that “[s]uch a conflict, unless outweighed by other factors, would by itself be reason 
to decline exercise of jurisdiction.”49 Still, even with such a consideration, the Court looked at 
factors such as whether the foreign entity intended to affect American markets and at the 
“substantial nature of the effect produced.”50 If the activity had a substantial enough effect, the 
Court ultimately determined that such a consideration could outweigh any international 
enforcement conflicts that may have been created.51   
Even when Congress has created vague or indefinite language, the Court has still allowed 
American agencies and courts breathing room to extend their international reach.52 The Court has 
found that, “Congress expressed no view on the question whether a court with Sherman Act 
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international 
comity.”53 The first question of the Court’s test is whether “there is in fact a true conflict 
between domestic and foreign law.”54 In other words, just because a foreign entity has complied 
with foreign law does not mean an international conflict of enforcement has been created if the 
United States has differing policies which do not affect enforcement of said entity in said foreign 
country. The Court has thus concluded “the fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it 
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took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws.”55 The Court has 
said this is true even if the other nation encourages such actions within its own borders,56 so long 
as, “no conflict exists, for these purposes, ‘where a person subject to regulation by two states can 
comply with the laws of both.’”57 Thus, unless a foreign entity can argue that their nation’s 
domestic “law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or 
claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible,” the Court 
has said that there is no conflict, and the principles of foreign relations laws are upheld.58 As 
long as no conflict exists, the Court has found no need to reach the question of comity.59  
Thus, antitrust jurisprudence could offer the CFTC an analogous foundation that holds 
the principle that, if an entity participating in derivative activities that have effect on multiple 
jurisdictions can comply with both jurisdictions’ regulations without lacking compliance with 
their local jurisdiction, comity is not breached. This would mean that a potentially more 
restrictive nation may be able to have international reach as added restrictions do not create a 
conflict in themselves. In the context of financial regulation, those added rights would be 
comparable to added regulations of a jurisdiction that adds to but does not have effect on the 
other jurisdiction. In other words, in the derivatives context, this would mean that, if the United 
States was more restrictive than Europe, the United States could still enforce its more restrictive 
regulations without breaking international comity, as long as those regulations were merely more 
restrictive as opposed to contradictory. An illustration might be increased collateral 
requirements. If the European Union requires a collateral amount lower than the United States, 
the company could still comply with U.S. regulations by keeping more collateral without being 
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in any way in conflict with their Europe based requirements which simply require a lower 
amount, not a different procedure. This gives the United States a great argument to promote 
regulations that are not in conflict with other bodies but are instead additional or more restrictive 
measures of similar requirements in that jurisdiction.     
 The problem with international comity and cooperation is that it may work in theory and 
even in practical application the majority of the time but, with so many different jurisdictional 
interests at play, there are bound to be examples of what happens when these principles falter. 
This is why the GE/Honeywell example is particularly illustrative of extraterritorial enforcement 
problems. In 2000 and 2001, American based international conglomerates, General Electric and 
Honeywell, two companies who made everything from home appliances to jet engine parts, 
attempted a merger, driven by Jack Welch, General Electric’s chairman at the time.60 
Honeywell’s strengths, particularly those in aviation electronics, were complimentary to General 
Electric’s research and product line, especially regarding General Electric’s jet engine 
manufacturing division.61 The deal happened quickly after Welch made a counteroffer to beat 
United Technologies Corporation’s own bid for Honeywell.62 Thus, in late 2000, the 
corporations seemingly had a deal in place that would make it the largest ever merger between 
two such companies.63 The only thing that stood in their way was clearance by merger review 
agencies such as the United States Department of Justice.64 
 As both companies were American based, they thought the deal would easily move 
forward after the U.S. Department of Justice approved the merger after placing a few obligations 
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on GE, such as the divestment of some of its helicopter division.65 However, a few months later, 
the European Commission for Competition attempted to block the merger, arguing its potential 
harm to competition.66 Many American economists and analysts were puzzled by the intense 
scrutiny placed on the merger by the Commission.67 After all, this would have been the first time 
the E.U. commission blocked a merger of two non-European companies that was already 
approved by the domestic regulatory agency of those companies.68 Still, that is exactly what 
occurred as, in unprecedented fashion, the Commission stopped the merger, killing the deal in its 
entirety.69  
 The failure of the GE/Honeywell merger has significance beyond its own confines and 
illustrates ramifications beyond mere antitrust principles. It is an example of what can go wrong 
within the principles of international comity when pressured by competing jurisdictional interests 
and concerns, issues that are sure to have analogies when applied to financial activities such as 
derivatives. An observer to the ordeal stated the international regulatory ramifications of the 
modern world as follows: “In the macho world of merger regulation…authorities strive to win a 
tough reputation.”70 While General Electric was an American headquartered company, it still had 
major operations in Europe and would have had major effects on European customers, 
competitors, and related European companies.71 The GE case thus offers the illustration that 
while operations within a jurisdiction’s borders may give the jurisdiction enforcement abilities, it 
is the effect of a company’s activities that may also concern regulators who may be willing to 
regulate extraterritorially to prevent domestic effect on commerce.   
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 The American banks are arguing that swaps performed through their subsidiaries 
overseas should not be regulated by Dodd-Frank and instead be left to the regulating authorities 
of the country where the actions are taking place.72 But, if the CFTC sees that those actions are 
having an effect in the U.S., it arguably could find itself in a situation similar to what Europe 
found itself in regarding the GE deal. On one hand, the CFTC may not want to regulate too 
heavy handedly over non-American entities and activities. On the other end, the CFTC and 
American regulators are likely to find themselves in a situation where major swap and derivative 
transactions are taking place overseas. In between these questions is the reality of retaliation 
which might occur once one country is viewed as reaching too far. Be it in antitrust or 
derivatives regulation, if the U.S. views European regulatory actions as inappropriate, such as the 
GE blockage, then the U.S. may retaliate by blocking an activity which might otherwise be 
viewed as Eurocentric. The failure of comity in one regulatory enforcement reaction thus may 
cause further collapse of the principles of comity, causing distrust or bitterness on both sides, 
ruining a notion of cooperation, an element that may be crucial in international derivatives 
regulation. Furthermore, as the CFTC reviews these transactions, it is likely that activities could 
include two subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, two parties which are completely foreign based but 
large enough to have a commercial impact on the United States, or any mash up of possible 
relationships in between such a spectrum. When would it thus be appropriate for the CFTC to get 
involved? 
 The CFTC could break down these types of activities in a few ways. First, on the simplest 
of levels, if an American corporation was purchasing credit default swaps with an American 
subsidiary operating out of London, the CFTC could likely argue that the activity was actually 
initiated in the United States, potentially allowing the CFTC jurisdictional support and thus 
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regulation enforcement abilities. Extraterritorial reach quickly grows murky from here. Second, 
what if that American corporation was operating through a former or newly created subsidiary or 
an even less related financial partner which is based in London? Third, what if the American 
corporation sold all of its swaps or mortgages to a foreign entity several years before and then 
that foreign entity later sold the swaps or mortgages to the American subsidiary located in 
London? Meanwhile, the original American corporation has purchased new swaps which hedge 
against its subsidiary’s investment and relationship to the foreign entity which is actually weakly 
leveraged against junk mortgages and swaps initially sold by the American corporation to begin 
with. Do any of these actions meet the “direct and significant” requirements? If the foreign entity 
were to collapse, it would certainly have an impact on U.S. domestic commerce. Such a 
significant impact could arguably be direct in that its initiation was within the U.S., even if such 
an initiation was several swaps and sales ago. The downfall of one of the world’s largest 
companies could also thus be deemed significant, especially if the downfall were to be related to 
U.S. commerce in the first place. Thus, for reasons analogous to the European Commission in 
the GE case, the U.S. would have an interest to monitor and regulate the American corporation’s 
foreign subsidiary’s international transactions if not the completely foreign entity’s transactions 
as well, based on the argument of significant effect. Of course, international comity could 
quickly dissipate if the regulators in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Brussels had approved or ignored the 
activity that the CFTC sought to regulate extraterritorially. Thus, the challenge of extraterritorial 
enforcement by the CFTC mirrors that of the antirust agencies: As the U.S. complained of 
overreach by the European Commission in GE/Honeywell, so might Europe complain the CFTC 
is overreaching in its derivatives enforcement.   
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 An analytical argument of the GE deal was the frequent observation and criticism by 
many that the stoppage of the deal was little more than local or regional politics at play.73 Prof. 
Grant suspected “that the Commission’s decision may have been affected by bureaucratic 
capture, such that civil servants did not follow the mandate that had been assigned to them.”74 
While Prof. Grant’s argument focuses blame on the action of a single regulatory agency, it could 
almost justify restricting all regulation in total. Instead, his argument actually illustrates the much 
greater problem of international cooperation. Any agency or commission is inherently political to 
some degree to protect the interests of its own sovereign civilians or corporations, even if such 
instances may be locally fueled by little more than public relations considerations.75 Be it the 
GE/Honeywell deal in Europe or the Dubai Ports deal in the United States, a sovereign’s wants 
and needs often come into play, be they corporate, political, or other. The very reason 722(d) 
exists is for the United States to protect the interests of its own soil, which sometimes extends to 
protecting against foreign based activity. If such sovereign interests could be universally 
enforced through mere comity, 722(d) would not even be necessary. Yet, its existence highlights 
the complex realities of extraterritorial enforcement. 
 Much of the problem regarding any extraterritorial reach is complexity as both the 
regulated entities and regulators can find it difficult to follow, creating uncertainty and great 
expense. With no such certainty, a financial institution may have to get some sort of derivatives 
pre-clearance in not only the U.S. and Europe but also Brazil, Japan, Korea, Australia, and a host 
of other countries. Beyond mere expense, it seems inefficient and almost impractical as 
derivative swaps and purchases, unlike mergers which may expectedly take months or years, are 
often meant to adapt quickly to other transactions and market occurrences. The political 
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challenges of extraterritorial jurisdiction are not limited to the U.S. versus one other country. 
Instead, these are challenges facing jurisdictions across the world with a litany of concerns and 
complex relations to sort through.76 Already behind American legislators and regulatory 
agencies, the European regulating bodies are being further slowed by disagreements within their 
own borders.77 Few such discrepancies have received as much attention as over-the-counter 
derivatives, largely based out of London’s financial markets.78 Essentially all of the European 
nations but Britain have been on board for tougher clearing and regulatory standards for the non-
exchange driven over-the-counter market.79 
 As many of these rules were similar to goals of Dodd-Frank in regards to over-the-
counter transactions, the British government and regulatory agencies have faced massive 
pressure from within the country that arguably mirrors the pressure placed upon the CFTC and 
SEC from the large American banks who host similar concerns.80 Britain was faced with being 
the minority party at the enforcement table, hosting only eight percent of the voting power on an 
issue where it holds seventy-five percent or so of the over-the-counter derivatives market in 
Europe.81 The very occurrence of such a disparity illustrates the race to the bottom effect as these 
transactions have flowed into Britain because British regulators offer the fewest regulations, 
illustrated by the rest of the continent’s efforts to beef up these loose standards.82 This race to the 
bottom effect is one of the key difficulties in practical application of financial regulations, as will 
be discussed in the next section of this paper. In contrast, Germany has been seeking greater 
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influence over the regulations regarding exchange driven derivatives which are largely run out of 
Frankfurt.83 What has been the result? For months, George Osborne, British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, has been pushing back, insisting on stronger domestically based decision making 
processes that can potentially trump uniformity enforcement agencies at the larger E.U. level.84 
While not firmed up by final passage, Osborne seemed to have won “a concession that would in 
most cases prevent the national regulator from being overruled on the authorization of trading by 
companies in over-the-counter derivatives in Britain.”85 Still, even if such a concession takes 
hold in permanent reform, it still strikes of the same problems that are likely to exist under 
722(d). Just as the U.S. is generally conceding its right to enforcement overseas to other 
jurisdictions, the E.U. compromise allows Britain to cede uniformity of regulation to the E.U. 
unless its own regulatory review boards think differently.86 Both 722(d) and the E.U. 
compromise illustrate how each body arguably is agreeing to international and multi-state 
comity, unless they strongly find it in their interest not to follow such comity. With such a 
philosophy, the risk of GE/Honeywell instances in the financial context may be all but assured.        
 Even though such challenges may create pessimism, many have argued that 
GE/Honeywell has actually improved international comity in the antitrust context, thus allowing 
us to look at it as a model from which financial regulators can learn from. William Kolasky, a 
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice not long after the 
GE/Honeywell debacle, has stated that this progress has resulted from the realization of nations 
that international comity may have taken on a new meaning in this globalized world.87 His view 
is that, instead of using comity to prevent extraterritorial reach of one’s laws, “We have come to 
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accept that in a global economy, conduct will often have effects in multiple jurisdictions and that 
each jurisdiction has not only the right, but the obligation to protect its own consumers.”88 He 
thus summarized that the world has “shifted (its) attention…to promoting greater cooperation 
among jurisdictions and to achieving greater substantive convergence of…legal standards...”89 
As an illustration of such progress, Kolasky describes a successful antitrust model that has relied 
on an intense push by the United States and other nations to sit down and lessen the divergence 
of their antitrust laws through communication and an expression of sovereign interests, 
particularly through the DOJ created International Competition Network (“ICN”).90 ICN, an 
organization with now over 80 jurisdictions participating, has succeeding at getting multiple 
jurisdictions to achieve near agreement of their antitrust laws and procedures, including the 
recommended following of merger notification practices.91 Kolasky concluded that such agreed 
procedures have “already had a dramatic impact in moving jurisdictions to improve their procedures 
and reduce the burden on multinational businesses,” potentially a great model for financial regulators 
and regulated entities who may be looking for some international certainty, hoping against diverse 
regulations which might create inefficient and expensive pre-clearance and related procedures.92  
Even using antitrust law as an analogy, it still must be addressed how the CFTC can apply these 
principles in the financial regulatory context. Additionally, while antitrust law allows the most 
restrictive body potentially the most say, it needs to be examined whether, in the financial 
regulation context, the race to the bottom effect, that which may allow the least restrictive body 
to gain financial activities seeking security from strong regulation, will likely have any real 
effect. 
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The Proposed Practical Application of Extraterritorial Enforcement for the CFTC and 
Preventing the Race to the Bottom Effect 
 Even if the CFTC were to use the antitrust analogy as its base, it still must come to terms 
with the practical effect of its ultimate extraterritorial enforcement policy. Unlike antitrust law 
where the most restrictive regulatory agency has the ability to have the final say, potentially 
trumping other jurisdictions, regulators in the financial markets have to consider the inverse: the 
race to the bottom effect.93 Most recently, American legislators, with an assist from the nation’s 
largest banks, have cautioned that domestic regulations with too much teeth could ultimately 
harm U.S. financial commerce, supporting the argument that such financial transactions will 
move offshore to a location with the least restrictive regulations in place.94 While some, like the 
banks, may be making this argument to ultimately weaken the effectiveness of Dodd-Frank, 
critics on the other end of the spectrum are concerned that, in the context of the race to the 
bottom effect, overly heavy handed domestic regulations, if they in fact do move such 
transactions offshore, may make Dodd-Frank similarly ineffective as these dangerous 
transactions may continue to skirt U.S. regulators, leaving U.S. commerce in danger of future 
financial mishandlings.95 The question then becomes, are these fears justified, or might the 
CFTC be able to prevent these very problems by actually adopting an antitrust model which 
promotes universal comity and financial regulatory agreement? If the U.S. is to exercise some 
degree of extraterritorial enforcement, the argument can thus be made that these concerns may be 
unjustified. The result would allow the CFTC to properly give some teeth to domestic 
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enforcement without too much fear that these regulations will cause potentially damaging 
transactions and activities to move offshore. 
 As was seen in the antitrust context, collateral requirements and other aspects of Dodd-
Frank may not be the biggest concern for the CFTC as the agency can apply more restrictive 
requirements that do not necessarily conflict with overseas obligations.96 If a company faces 
collateral requirements in London that are two percent below that of the United States, that 
company will likely figure out how to meet American requirements so as not to lose the ability to 
deal with the American market. Instead, perhaps the most important consideration regarding 
enforcement in the international context deals with transparency, an issue addressed by data 
reporting and ultimately clearinghouse requirements in Dodd-Frank.97 This rationale argues that 
one of the most helpful ideals for the CFTC to push as it spreads its message to international 
regulatory bodies is one of data reporting and sharing as, with such transparency in place, 
investors, financial institutions, and regulators from around the world at least know what they are 
dealing with as they review transactions and activities, even if the results that are reported show 
problematic symptoms.98 Thus, even if, say collateral requirements, are different in two different 
jurisdictions, at least reviewing parties on both sides are able to recognize the differences and 
decide if activities in the less restrictive jurisdiction might not be something they want to get 
involved in, or, in the terms of a regulatory agency, be something that the agency wants to 
attempt to regulate in some way, even if it means some sort of extraterritorial reach is required. 
 The recent example of MF Global serves as an illustration of the important nature of this 
transparency argument. While the collapse of MF Global made headlines for a few days, it did 
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not reach or cause the mass contagion effect that resulted from the downfall of Lehman Brothers 
and other financial institutions in 2008.99 In many ways, this limited outflow has to do with MF 
Global’s size which was nowhere near that of Lehman Brothers or the bailouts of AIG.100 Still, it 
can be argued that one of the very reasons MF Global did not turn into a bigger financial 
nightmare was transparency, preventing it from being a larger collapse.101 While complaints have 
been lodged against the CFTC for not properly reviewing what MF Global was doing with 
individual client funds, the relevant issue here is that investors and other participants were able to 
see the mess MF Global had gotten itself into, investing and leveraging itself in European bonds 
and debt, something most participants wanted nothing to do with.102 As news broke, investors 
fled, leaving MF Global to file bankruptcy within days.103 As bad as the situation was, without 
transparency, it arguably could have turned into a bigger disaster.104 Even if MF Global or other 
financial institutions were failing to follow other obligations of Dodd-Frank as its regulations get 
rolled out, arguably one of the most important things is to know detrimental activities are 
occurring, such as the case was in MF Global.105 All of this relies on the notion of transparency, 
an attainable proposition supported by data reporting requirements that already exist under the 
language of Dodd-Frank. 
 With data reporting as its base, the CFTC is then able to expand its extraterritorial reach 
by obtaining international cooperation on these requirements. This international cooperation on 
data reporting is important for a few reasons. First, it tells U.S. regulators, as well as financial 
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participants and investors, what is going on in financial transactions abroad.106 Like the situation 
in MF Global, even if base line spreadsheets tell ominous signs of financial institutions gone 
awry, it is better to know and act accordingly than to continue to transact through an unknown 
abyss.107 Secondly, it allows the CFTC to root out the jurisdictional nature and location of where 
global activities are occurring, allowing the agency to synch up with the analogies created in the 
antitrust context. By utilizing a more global data reporting cooperative, whether it is a near 
universal reporting center or a country by country cooperative, the CFTC may then be able to 
draw the line on when an activity has a “direct and significant” connection to U.S. commerce, 
thus allowing it some sort of direct regulatory abilities or perhaps indirect reach. 
 The CFTC will come across activities that have varied levels of connection to the United 
States, but all of them may be subject to U.S. regulatory influence in some way. The first and 
most straightforward example involves an activity which has funding from U.S. persons or 
corporations or one that interacts with U.S. persons or corporations who are counterparties to the 
transaction. This example would be easy for the CFTC to regulate without stepping on 
international toes as one of the financial participants would be rooted in the United States.108 
U.S. hedge funds, pensions, and individual investment activities originating out of the U.S. could 
all be covered, even if one of the participants were internationally based as one of the 
participants still had a direct connection to the United States.           
 The second level of regulated activities, those activities which may involve foreign 
parties operating foreign transactions that may be traceable back to the United States, requires 
greater extraterritorial reach, but this reach is consistent with the principles adopted from the 
antitrust analogy as combined with the realities of financial activity. As seen by the financial 
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meltdown of 2008, major detrimental financial activity in one nation leads to contagion that 
spreads globally, allowing the CFTC the argument that it is able to reach extraterritorially to 
regulate activities which may trace back to or effect U.S. financial institutions or commerce.109 
The antitrust analogy gives us a helpful example, such as the ongoing litigation regarding De 
Beers, an international company acting internationally.110 On the surface, the United States 
would lack jurisdiction if limiting the analysis to a foreign activity done by a foreign entity on 
the prong of “direct” connection. As De Beers shows though, foreign activity by foreign actors 
can have an immense influence on domestic commerce and markets, in this case on diamond 
pricing internationally and thus within the United States, allowing the U.S. regulators to make 
the argument that it was in violation of U.S. antitrust laws, satisfying the “significant” prong.111 
There was a time when this argument failed, such as in 1945 when U.S. regulators were denied 
jurisdiction over the activities of De Beers.112 But, in the modern world of global commerce and 
resulting effect, such large activities are bound to have effect on U.S. commercial interests, 
allowing for rational arguments of U.S. extraterritorial reach in such instances. As a result, U.S. 
regulators have been able to obtain a massive settlement against De Beers under the notion of a 
non-U.S. company acting collusively, even if internationally, to ultimately have effect on U.S. 
commerce.113 The realities of global financial activities are aptly comparable as financial 
institutions attempting to circumvent U.S. regulators overseas should still be able to fall prey to 
American regulators if their activities trace back to the United States, something likely to occur 
in many large scale financial activities.    
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 Though the CFTC is able to cast a broad net to reach almost any foreign activity or entity 
under this rationale, practical limits should be put in place to limit international pushback which 
may undermine needed cooperation from non-domestic regulatory agencies.114 As has been 
argued, it is important for the CFTC to promote international cooperation and uniformity, as 
Chairman Gensler has himself stated.115 Under this rationale, while the CFTC may theoretically 
reach many such transactions on its own, it is cleaner and less politically difficult to promote 
uniform standards that allow other agencies to enforce regulations on activities happening within 
their own jurisdictions. If uniformity or near uniformity is in place, the CFTC can feel confident 
that its same procedures are being enforced internationally without having to step on regulatory 
toes and causing complaints of overreach.116 The result is that more regulatory bodies are 
satisfied, further promoting comity and allowing further cooperation on such important issues as 
data reporting and data sharing.     
 The practical application of this would allow the CFTC to regulate activity taking place 
one jurisdiction away but rely on comity to reach activities further removed than a one-step 
reach. The illustration of this promotes the idea that the United States can regulate any activity 
taking place between a U.S. participant and a U.K. participant, even if the activity is perhaps 
facilitated through London. The activity involves a U.S. entity or capital infusion, allowing the 
CFTC little difficulty in making the argument that the activity has a “direct” connection to the 
United States based on its active American participant.117 A different policy consideration must 
occur when the activity is two steps away from the U.S., such as a transaction between a party in 
the United Kingdom and a party in Singapore. In a large scale financial activity, especially one 
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with major concerns, such as a Singapore version of Lehman, the CFTC could argue the 
“significant” prong of 722(d), making the case for extraterritorial reach.118 Still, such may not be 
needed and may be politically unwise as the CFTC can ensure similar regulatory satisfaction 
through regulatory comity, in this instance, by allowing United Kingdom regulators the ability to 
review the activity.  
  International comity allows the United States the ability to enforce its own regulatory 
policies and prevent domestic effect on commerce without causing consternation and potential 
retaliation of foreign regulatory bodies. In the above instance, the United States can rely on the 
United Kingdom to, at the very least, share data reporting information on the Singapore activity 
between Singapore’s institution and that of the United Kingdom participant. Furthermore, 
assuming international comity and cooperation has created regulatory policy in the United 
Kingdom that closely matches that of the United States, the CFTC can rely on the notion that the 
United Kingdom, in protecting its own interests while also promoting international comity, will 
be reviewing the activity with Singapore in a relatively similar manner as the United States 
would if it were doing the same. This allows the United States almost vicarious reach through the 
United Kingdom without having to create a political mess of overreach. In return, the United 
States is able to share similar data and participate in similar enforcement with activities between 
the U.S. and Singapore that may have an effect on the United Kingdom. This principle of comity 
then conceivably includes all of the major nations and their regulating bodies, ensuring that 
almost any transaction may be no more than two steps away from the nation hosting regulatory 
concerns. And, while the concerned nation may not be participating directly, it is still being 
sufficed and comforted by its influence through the principle of comity. Of course, this creates 
even more protection if Singapore regulators are on board and already participating in this global 
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cooperative. In such an instance, the U.K. regulators may never even have to exert extraterritorial 
reach themselves but are at least in place to step in as a safety net if needed. Under any scenario, 
this prevents a situation where a Singapore firm’s activities could lead to the collapse of a British 
institution whose collapse would lead to a subsequent collapse of an American institution, thus 
dramatically limiting the concern of financial contagion.  
 An objection to this notion, as made by the banks and some legislators, is that this 
reliance on extraterritorial reach and promotion of international comity would allow the CFTC to 
regulate Dodd-Frank with some real teeth, causing American capital and financial commerce to 
flee to less regulated safe havens.119 Still, this argument should fail for a few reasons. First, if the 
less regulated jurisdiction is still within two steps of the United States, as long as the middle 
jurisdiction, such as the United Kingdom in the above example, is actively participating in 
cooperation with the United States, the financial institution has little to nothing to gain by 
moving its capital to Singapore. Even if Singapore is a mostly unregulated market, as illustrated 
above, the principle of international comity will mean the United Kingdom is going to step in to 
promote standards of regulation. Thus, the argument only has some level of legitimate concern if 
done three steps away, i.e. an activity done between two jurisdictions who are both loosely 
regulated and accordingly not a participant in this cooperative network. The reality is, as seen by 
Chairman Gensler’s description of participating countries already on board, that the nations with 
the largest derivative and financial activity are already in working agreement to promote some 
sort of comity based enforcement network.120 Furthermore, masking activity to hide U.S. 
connections and avert U.S. regulators would be dangerous, difficult, and likely expensive.121 To 
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be a viable concern, this would mean financial players would have to move their activities to 
new or smaller centers, creating new transaction zones between say, Maldives and Bermuda. 
While some activities and transactions could move to these loose and small jurisdictions, it 
would likely only create a financial commerce effect on the margins. Such a hypothesis stretches 
cynicism as it would require the most talented and lucrative hedge funds, hedge fund managers, 
banks, bankers, and other financial personnel and institutions to abandon ship and move to these 
new, and potentially remote, locations. While it is true that, if heavily regulated, the U.S. may 
lose out on new capital infusions, hemorrhaging its current market share on the sole reason of 
heavy regulation seems remote.122 The same has been illustrated in other commercial arenas as, 
while statutory incentives have changed the dynamic at the margins, no jurisdiction has been 
able to take Hollywood out of the film industry.123 The talent and main operations are 
indefinitely there to stay.124 Likewise, it is a difficult proposition to argue that the financial world 
will abandon New York, London, Frankfurt, Shanghai, and Tokyo for the indefinite future. Thus, 
any push to create new hedge funds in Dubai or other locales is limited.  
 The antitrust analogy comes full circle when applying these principles to the mentioned 
case of De Beers. If a similar scenario were to occur in the context of the financial markets, the 
United States would be one or two steps away from De Beers. While the United States finally 
exerted its reach over the international diamond market,125 the antitrust principles from that and 
related instances show the CFTC that, while it could exert such reach and sometimes may have 
to, it could most often rely on the principles of international comity, ensuring that its goals were 
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met without having to overreach. The United States would then be able to enforce stricter rules 
domestically and promote uniformity internationally as it lobbies for the principles of comity.       
Conclusion 
 As the CFTC continues to go through its rulemaking process, it has much to consider in 
how it views principles of international comity. Based on their public comments and actions, it 
seems clear the CFTC is doing its best to do what it can from the outset to prevent conflict of 
laws between nations. As seen by Mr. Gensler’s travels to Europe,126 the CFTC is attempting to 
get derivatives regulations abroad to mirror the Dodd-Frank legislation that has already been 
passed here at home.127 If such language mirrors that of Dodd-Frank, theoretical and potential 
practical application of 722(d) would be limited, alleviating the CFTC’s likelihood of being 
involved in numerous and large extraterritorial disputes.128 Still, as seen by international antitrust 
enforcement, it seems almost naive to believe that, even if such mirrored laws were in place, 
issues of differing enforcement opinions, state interests, and other subjective factors are likely to 
come into play, creating a mess of international comity and enforcement of securities 
regulations.  
 Planning for such events, the CFTC is still able to find existing jurisprudential standards, 
as adopted from the antitrust context. Such an analogy approach to extraterritorial enforcement 
and jurisdiction would aid the CFTC in finding an approach that is generally hands off in regards 
to foreign activities while still having the ability to reach out on significant cases that may have a 
dramatic effect on U.S. commerce and financial well being. Still, the CFTC has much difficulty 
ahead. Domestic enforcement with teeth could drive American companies offshore or, in some 
instances, further offshore, making domestic enforcement of financial regulations almost 
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meaningless.129 The very purpose of Dodd-Frank could be undermined as dangerous and 
unregulated derivatives activities could be regulated to weak jurisdictions with an almost Wild 
West approach.130 In such a global financial market, the damage of such regulated activities are 
likely to reach back to American shores, even if the activities were not deemed to have an initial 
direct and significant connection to the U.S.131 On the flip side, if U.S. regulators, in fear of such 
overreach, simply water down and neuter Dodd-Frank, the reverse would occur. Even though 
such derivatives activities may remain stateside, domestic regulators, while having jurisdiction, 
may have little teeth to their enforcement principles, allowing such dangerous activity to 
continue, though this time, even closer to home. Still, as has been illustrated, all of these fears 
may best be alleviated by creating a network of nations that promote similar rules and policies 
and follow the principles of international comity. With such agreement in place, sovereign 
regulators are likely to cooperate to ensure their own interests are continually met and protected, 
themselves wanting to avoid the challenging landscape which may otherwise exist if they too had 
to revert to unilateral extraterritorial enforcement.   
 Whatever ultimate rule is to be adopted, it seems likely that growing pains will ensue as, 
no matter what is on paper, practical application is far more difficult, especially when multiple 
jurisdictions and sovereign interests are required to play together. To think otherwise would be to 
ignore what we have already learned from extraterritorial enforcement in the context of antitrust 
law. While not fool proof in itself, such a history of policy may yet serve as a strong foundation 
for the CFTC to adopt as it moves forward to ensure the U.S. markets and consumers are 
properly protected.   
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